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THE CONSTITUTION AND THE EMERGENCY DETENTION ACT
OF 1950
I. THE EMERGENCY DETENTION ACT OF 1950
Historical Background
The Emergency Detention Act of 19501 was passed on September 23, 1950
by a vote of 286-48 in the House and 57-10 in the Senate.2 The House Com-
mittee on Un-American Activities had urged the Act's passage to meet the threat
to internal security posed by the Communist Party both in the United States
and abroad.3 The Committee reported that:
Over 10 years of investigation by the Committee . . . has established
(1) that the Communist movement in the United States is foreign-
controlled; (2) that its ultimate objective with respect to the United
States is to overthrow our free American institutions in favor of a
Communist totalitarian dictatorship to be controlled from abroad;
(3) that its activities are carried on by secret and conspirational
methods; and (4) that its activities, both because of the scope and
nature of Communist activities here in the United States, constitute
an immediate and powerful threat to the security of the United States
and to the American way of life.4
The Bill of Rights Committee of the American Bar Association rendered the
opinion that the House Committee's finding of a clear and present danger to
national security was warranted and that the Act is constitutional in light
thereof. 5
General Statement of Provisions
The preamble to the Act 6 sets forth the legislative findings upon which the
Act is based, among them:
(1) There exists a world Communist movement which . . . is a world
wide revolutionary movement whose purpose it is, by treachery, deceit,
infiltration into other groups (governmental and otherwise), espionage,
sabotage, terrorism, and any other means deemed necessary, to estab-
lish a Communist totalitarian dictatorship in all the countries of the
World through the medium of a world wide Communist organization.
(4) The direction and control of the world Communist movement is
1. 64 Stat. 1019-30 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §§ 811-26 (1951).
2. 96 Cong. Rec. 15632-33 (1950) (House of Representatives); id. at 15520-726
(Senate).
3. H.R. Rep. No. 2980, 81st .Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), 1950 U.S. Code Congressional
Service 3886 [subsequent volumes titled U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News]; see Emergency
Detention Act of 1950 [hereinafter cited as "Act"] § 101, 64 Stat. 1019-23, 50 U.S.C. § 811
(1951).
4. Id. at 3886.
5. Id. at 3890 (opinion rendered upon request to the House Un-American Activities
Committee (HUAC)).
6. Act § 101, 64 Stat. 1019-21 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 811 (1951).
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vested in and exercised by the Communist dictatorship of a foreign!
country.
(7) . . . [T]hose individuals who knowingly and willfully participate
in the World Communist movement . . . in effect repudiate their
allegiance to the United States ....
(11) The security and safety of the territory and Constitution of the
United States, and the successful prosecution of the common defense,
especially in time of invasion, war, or insurrection in aid of a foreign
enemy, require every reasonable and lawful protection against espio-
nage, and against sabotage to national-defense material, premises,
forces and utilities . . . and other activities essential to national de-
fense.
(12) Due to the wide distribution and complex interrelation of facili-
ties which are essential to national defense and due to the increased
effectiveness and technical development in espionage and sabotage ac-
tivities, the free and unrestrained movement in such emergencies of
members or agents of such organizations . . . would made adequate
surveillance to prevent espionage and sabotage impossible and would
therefore constitute a clear and present danger to the peace and safety
of the United States.
(14) The detention of persons who there is reasonable ground to be-
lieve probably will commit or conspire with others to commit espionage
or sabotage is, in a time of internal security emergency, essential to
the common defense and to the safety and security of the . . . United
States.7
The President is authorized to declare an "internal security emergency'"
when any of the following occur:
(1) Invasion of the territory of the United States or its possessions,
(2) Declaration of war by Congress, or
(3) Insurrection within the United States in aid of a foreign
enemy .... s
During such emergency, the Attorney General may "apprehend and by order
detain . . . each person as to whom there is reasonable ground to believe . . .
will engage in, or probably will conspire with others to engage in, acts of espi-
onage or of sabotage."9 Release of detainees may be effected in one of four ways:
(1) by the termination of the internal security emergency by either
presidential proclamation or congressional resolution;
(2) by order of the Attorney General;
7. Act § 101(l), (4), (7), (11), (12), (14), 64 Stat. 1019-21 (1950), 50 U.S.C.
§ 811(1), (4), (7), (11), (12), (14) (1951).
8. Act § 102(a), 64 Stat. 1021 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 812(a) (1951).
9. Act § 103(a), 64 Stat. 1021 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 813(a) (1951).
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(3) by final order after hearing before the Board of Detention Re-
view; or
(4) by final order of a federal court either upon review of the Deten-
tion Board's action or upon a writ of habeas corpus.' 0
Within forty-eight hours following apprehension, the detainee is to be taken
before a preliminary hearing officer." There, the detainee shall be informed of
the grounds for his detention; his right to retain counsel; his right to a pre-
liminary examination; his right to withhold making any statements; and that
should he make any statement, it may be used against him.12 If the detainee
does not waive his right to a preliminary examination, evidence shall be heard
within a reasonable time.' 3 He may offer evidence and cross-examine government
witnesses except that the Attorney General "shall not be required to furnish
information the revelation of which would disclose the identity or evidence of
Government agents or officers which he believes it would be dangerous to
national safety and security to divulge."'14
An order of detention may be revoked or modified when the Attorney Gen-
eral receives, upon the request of the detainee, additional information which
negates the reasonable ground for detention. 15 However, with respect to either
court or Detention Board review of the detention order, again the Attorney
General "shall not be required to offer or present evidence of any agents or
officers of the Government the revelation of which in his judgment would be
dangerous to the security and safety of the United States."'-6 The Attorney
General is authorized to prescribe regulations to effectuate the Act subject to
the limitations that detainees are not to be required to perform forced labor or
be confined with criminals. 17 The Detention Review Board is subject to the
Administrative Procedure Act.' 8 The Board is empowered to require the Attorney
General to furnish the detainee with "as full particulars of the evidence as
possible, including the identity of informants" except where the Attorney Gen-
eral "believes it would be dangerous to national safety and security to divulge."'19
The Board and its hearing examiners may secretly consider evidence which the
Attorney General "in his discretion offers to present [but] which cannot be
publicly revealed for reasons of national security." 20 Review of Detention Board
determinations may be had to the United States Court of Appeals,2 ' and review
of Court of Appeals determinations may be had to the Supreme Court by writ
10. Act § 103(b), 64 Stat. 1021 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 813(b) (1951).




15. Act § 104(e), 64 Stat. 1023 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 814(e) (1951).
16. Act § 104(f), 64 Stat. 1023 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 814(f) (1951).
17. Act § 104(g), 64 Stat. 1023 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 814(g) (1951).
18. Act § 108, 64 Stat. 1024-25 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 818 (1951).
19. Act § 109(c), 64 Stat. 1025 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 819(c) (1951).
20. Act § 109(g), 64 Stat. 1026 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 819(g) (1951).
21. Act § 111(c), 64 Stat. 1028-29 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 821(c) (1951).
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of certiorari or by certification. 22 The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
expressly preserved.
23
The preamble further declares that the detention shall not interfere with
the constitutional rights and privileges of anyone, but "at the same time shall
be sufficiently effective to permit the performance by the Cohgress and the
President of their Constitutional duties to provide for the common defense, to
wage war, and to preserve and protect the Constitution, the Government and
the people of the United States."
24
The Historical Use of the War Power to Detain Persons Deemed
Dangerous to National Security
The use of the war power to detain was initially employed with respect to
aliens. In 1798, the Alien and Sedition Acts were passed.23 The Enemy Alien
Act26 authorized the President to make provision for the apprehension, restraint,
securement and removal as alien enemies, all subjects of enemy nations with
which we were at war who were present within the United States. That Act
provided:
That it shall be lawful for the President . .. to order all such aliens
as he shall judge dangerous to the peace and safety of the United
States, or shall have reasonable grounds to suspect are concerned in
any treasonable or secret machinations against the government thereof
to depart out of the territory of the United States .... 27
During the War of 1812, proclamations were made excluding male British
subjects from residing within a forty mile distance from the eastern United
States coastline, 23 and the proclamations were upheld.2 9
During the Civil War, President Lincoln suspended the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus and Congress later ratified.a0 It has been estimated that
approximately 38,000 executive arrests were made during this period, and men
known, or suspected to be dangerous to national security were detained indefi-
nitely in military prisons without charges being lodged against them or trials
being held.3 '
World War II presented a prominent example of restrictive measures taken
in the name of the war power. By presidential proclamation in December of
22. Act § 111(d), 64 Stat. 1029 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 821(d) (1951).
23. Act § 116, 64 Stat. 1030 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 826 (1951).
24. Act § 101(15), 64 Stat. 1021 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 811(15) (1951).
25. 1 Stat. 577-78 (1798); see Emerson & Haber, Political and Civil Rights in the
United States 275-78 (2d ed. 1958).
26. Ibid. See generally Miller, Crisis in Freedom (1951) for an historical commentary
on the Alien and Sedition Acts.
27. 1 Stat. 577 (1798).
28. See Freeman, Genealogy, Evacuation, Law, 28 Cornell L.Q. 414 (1943).
29. Lockington v. Smith, 15 Fed. Cas. 758 (No. 8488) (C.C.D. Pa. 1817); Lockington's
Case, 1 Brightly 269 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1813); Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110
(1814).
30. See Emerson & Haber, op. cit. supra note 25, at 281.
31. Hall, Free Speech in Wartime, 21 Colum. L. Rev. 528 (1921).
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1941, President Roosevelt restrained German, Italian, and Japanese Aliens from
endangering public safety.3 2 The rights of such persons to travel, bear arms,
possess photographic equipment, and to other activities was restricted, and
members of those nationality groups who were considered to be dangerous were
detained.3 3 Subsequently, particular areas along the west coast were declared
-off limits to alien enemies and thereafter a curfew and other restrictions were
imposed along the entire coast; consequently, some ten thousand Japanese,
Italian, and German aliens were relocated.84
On March 21, 1942, Public Law No. 503 was passed, making it a mis-
demeanor to knowingly perform an act in a military zone contrary to the order
of a military commander. 35 Three days later, Lieutenant General DeWitt, mili-
tary commander for the west coast area, prohibited both Japanese aliens and
citizens of Japanese ancestry from leaving a certain area; other Japanese aliens
and citizens were evacuated from certain designated areas and detained.36 The
program with respect to these Japanese included the curfew; their exclusion
from the west coast; their confinement pending loyalty investigations; and in-
definite confinement of those found to be disloyal; all measures proposed and
accepted as military necessities.
37
In Hirabayaski v. United States,38 Kiyoshi Hirabayashi, an American citi-
zen of Japanese descent, was convicted in federal district court under Public Law
No. 503 for failing to observe the imposed curfew. On appeal, Hirabayashi
attacked the statute as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the
military and as discriminating against Japanese citizens as opposed to citizens
of other ancestry in violation of the fifth amendment. The Court held that it
was not faced with a question of the power of Congress to delegate: that the
issue was whether the Legislative and the Executive together had constitutional
authority to impose the curfew. Further in issue was whether the Legislative
and Executive could together delegate to the military the power "to appraise
the relevant conditions and on the basis of that appraisal to say whether, under
the circumstances, the time and place were appropriate for the promulgation of
the curfew order. . ... ,39 Answering both issues in the affirmative, the Court
said the following of the war power:
The power is not restricted as to the winning of victories in the field
32. Proclamation No. 2525, December 7, 1941, 6 Fed. Reg. 6321 (1941).
33. Freeman, supra note 23, at 416-17 (account of chronology of events leading up to
the Japanese detentions); see generally tenBroek, Barnhart & Matson, Prejudice, War and
the Constitution (1954) (history of and commentary upon Japanese-American evacuation and
resettlement).
34. Freeman, supra note 33, at 418.
35. Id. at 418-19 n.28; see Alexandre, Wartime Control of the Japanese-Americans, 28
Cornell L.Q. 385, 410-13 (1943) (for argument that Public Law No. 503 was proper delega-
tion of legislative authority). But cf., tenBroek, Barnhart & Matson, op. cit. supra note 33,
at 220-23.
36. Freeman, supra note 33, at 420.
37. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-A Disaster, 54 Yale L.J. 489, 513 (1945).
38. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
39. Id. at 92.
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and the repulse of enemy forces. It embraces every phase of the national
defense. . . .Where, as they [Executive and Legislative branches] did
here, the conditions call for the exercise of judgment and discretion and
for the choice of means, by those branches . .. on which the Consti-
tution has placed the responsibility of warmaking, it is not for any
court to sit in review of the wisdom of their action or substitute its
judgment for theirs.
40
The presence of the Japanese on the west coast and the threat of espionage and
sabotage thus posed was held to be ample warrant for the judgment made. In-
fringement of individual liberty is a necessary concomitant to the exercise of
the war powers, and to defendant's contention of discrimination the Court held
that the fifth amendment contains no equal protection clause, and only "dis-
criminatory legislation by Congress as amounts to a denial of due process"41 is
restrained. The Court applied a test of urgency: "Congress may hit at a par-
ticular danger where it is seen, without providing for others which are not so
evident or urgent.1
42
Korematsu v. United States43 involved another American citizen of Japanese
ancestry. There the conviction was for violating an exclusion order by remain-
ing within a military area. Appellant attacked the Hirabayaski assumption of a
threat of espionage and sabotage and asserted that the danger of Japanese inva-
sion had disappeared, thus nullifying the necessitating forces behind the statute
under which he was convicted. These arguments were rejected, and the convic-
tion was affirmed. The detention aspects of the exclusion program were upheld,
Mr. Justice Black for the majority stating that, "the power to exclude includes
the power to do it by force if necessary. And any forcible measure must neces-
sarily entail some degree of detention or restraint whatever method of removal
is selected."44 Mr. Justice Jackson's dissent in Korematsu foresaw dangers in
the decision: "The principle .. .lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the
hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent
need."
45
Ex Parte Endo46 involved another American citizen of Japanese ancestry
who, after having been removed to a relocation center, filed petition for a writ
of habeas corpus, which was denied. The Supreme Court reversed. In Endo, no
question of loyalty was present and the petitioner was being detained as part
of a quota plan of orderly relocation of detainees to inland areas. The Court
held that where the power to detain derives from the war power to protect
against espionage and sabotage, no lawful detention may be had of loyal citizens
who cannot be classified as being within the ambit of that objective:
40. Id. at 93.
41. Id. at 100.
42. Ibid.
43. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
44. Id. at 223.
45. Id. at 246. See Rostow, supra note 37, at 491 (asserting that Korentatsu increased
the power of the military over civil government by sanctioning an act of military power
without a factual record upon which the justification therefor could be found).
46. 323 U.S. 214, 282 (1944).
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The authority to detain a citizen or to grant him a conditional release
as protection against espionage or sabotage is exhausted at least when
his loyalty is conceded. If we held that the authority to detain con-




the implication from Endo is that, given a case of disloyalty, no constitu-
tional barrier would be present to prevent such detention.
48
Comparison of Japanese Evacuation Program with Emergency
Detention Act
The constitutional basis for the Japanese evacuation program was stated
by the Court in Hirabayaski to be the combined war powers of the Executive
and Legislative branches. In Hirabayashi, the Court upheld the use of the war
power as used in that program. The power underlying the Emergency Detention
Act is also the combined war powers of the Executive and Legislative: the
-congressional authorization is the statute itself, and the Act becomes operative
upon the presidential declaration of an internal security emergency. 49 The neces-
sity of the Japanese-American detention program was determined by military
judgment; the necessity of the Emergency Detention Act has been determined
by the congressional findings embodied in the ActY0 It has been advanced that
greater respect ought to be and probably will be accorded by the courts to these
-congressional findings than the military judgment of the Japanese-American
program, especially in light of the Court's reluctance to controvert the military
estimates of danger in those cases. 5' The Japanese-American program was
implemented by the military: the Emergency Detention Act is to be implemented
by the civil authorities, although it is conceivable that the military might play
a role in its implementation, e.g., during wartime.
Article I, section 8 of the federal Constitution authorizes Congress to de-
clare war, make rules for the governing of the armed forces, to provide for a
militia to carry out federal laws and put down domestic insurrections and foreign
invasions. Article I, section 9 provides for the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus "when in cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public safety may require it."
In Ex Parte Milligan,512 a habeas corpus proceeding was brought by a citizen,
not a member of the military, who had been convicted and sentenced to death
by a military commission. The Court held there that the war power rested on
necessity, and that unless some great exigency existed, e.g., invasion or rebellion
47. Id. at 302. See Dunbar, Beyond Korematsu: The Emergency Detention Act of 1950,
13 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 221, 226-27 (1952) (favorably comparing the Act with this statement
from Endo, and asserting that the legislative findings contained in the Act are a more
respectable basis for detention than Gen. De Witt's conclusions regarding the Japanese-
Americans).
48. See Note, 51 Colum. L. Rev. 606, 654 n.448 (1951).
49. See Act § 102(a), 64 Stat. 1021 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 812(a) (1951).
50. Act § 101, 64 Stat. 1019-21 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 811 (1951).
51. Dunbar, supra note 47, at 223.
52. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 110 (1866).
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that effectively nullified civil process, no citizen could be subjected to a military
tribunal or martial law. Since the civil courts were not interrupted in their oper-
ation, the military commission was without jurisdiction to try the petitioner
and his conviction was reversed. Whether the Japanese-American cases exceeded
the Milligan Court's concept of the scope of the war power will not be discussed
here. One writer has, however, criticized the Endo Court, viewing Milligan as
deciding that it is "illegal to arrest and confine after an unwarranted military
trial," and viewing the facts in Endo as arrest and confinement without any trial
at all. 63 Regardless, the Japanese-American cases strongly indicate a judicial
policy of non-interference with the legislative-executive judgment with respect
to dangers to national security. If for no other reason, the Emergency Detention
Act appears on firm ground.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
The Act has never been passed upon by the courts. It will, most likely, be
upheld as a valid exercise of the war power, at least in the sense of government's
right of self-defense.54 Dennis v. United States,5  decided one year after the
passage of the Act, impliedly supports the Act and the legislative findings from
which it arose. In Dennis, convictions under the Smith Act were upheld, Chief
Justice Vinson stating: "If Government is aware that a group aiming at its over-
throw is attempting to indoctrinate its members and to commit them to a course
whereby they will strike . . . action by the Government is required."5 , This
position was affirmed six years later in Yates v. United States.57 But Yates
emphasized that mere advocacy of overthrow of the government is not enough
to warrant government action: in addition, there must be present an overt act
or effort to effect the ends of such advocacy. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring
in Dennis, stated that with respect to Communist activities in the United States
"there is ample justification for a legislative judgment that the conspiracy now
before us is a substantial threat to national order and security."58 The legislative
findings and judgment behind the Act appear constitutionally acceptable, for the
Court has indicated its approval of the closely parallel legislative findings 0 set
forth in the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950.0 One of the most for-
midable constitutional issues that may be expected to be raised with respect to
the Act will be the question of the Act's infringement upon the first amendment
freedom of association.
0 '
53. Rostow, supra note 37, at 527. See Report of Commission on Government Security
254 (1957).
54. Cf. notes 47, 48 supra and accompanying text.
55. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
56. Id. at 509.
57. 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
58. 341 U.S. 494, 542 (1951).
59. See Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961)
(dictum).
60. Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 § 2, 64 Stat. 987-89, 50 U.S.C. § 781
(1951).
61. Cf. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
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Tocqueville observed: "There are no countries in which associations are
more needed, to prevent the despotism of faction or the arbitrary power of a
prince, than those which are democratically constituted.162 The first amendment
to the Constitution reads:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or of abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.
Although the right of association is not specifically mentioned in the Constitution,
it is impliedly supported by the first amendment rights of assembly, petition and
religion.6 3 This freedom, like all others guaranteed by the Constitution, is not
without restrictions, especially as pertains to the Communist Party.64 More
particularly:
Although there is a fundamental general freedom of association, there
is no constitutional freedom of subversive association. There is, how-
ever, a reflected right of subversive association which is of a sub-
constitutional order. This reflected right appears to exist only because
the fundamental guarantees of liberty in the Constitution, especially
due process and the freedom of speech and press and from self-incrim-
ination, prevent the government from interfering arbitrarily with the
members of subversive groups. The government may restrict or penalize
the members of subversive associations, at least those which seek to
overthrow the government, in any way it sees fit, subject only to the
restrictions imposed on it by those fundamental constitutional guaran-
tees. In dealing with subversive associations and their members, there-
fore, the government is not further restrained by the fundamental
freedom of association. It must be remembered, however, that the
fundamental guarantees of individual liberty which do inhibit the gov-
ernment in its dealings with subversive associations and their members
work genuine and substantial restraints upon the exercise of official
power. Often they are as effective in restricting the government as
would be a fundamental freedom of subversive association. 65
The preamble to the Emergency Detention Act does not regard the Com-
munist Party as a political party in the sense as that term is understood in the
United States.66 It classifies the Party as a foreign controlled movement designed
to overthrow the government of the United States, and its members as having
repudiated their allegiance to the United States."T The mere advocacy of over-
throw is protected by the Court's decision in Yates; but Yates and Dennis
together clearly establish the right of the government to act in its own defense
of the Communist objective.6 8 The congressional findings of necessity for the
62. 1 De Tocqueville, Democracy in America 197 (Reeve transl. 1904).
63. Rice, Freedom of Association 36 (1962).
64. See generally id. at 137-75.
65. Id. at 177. (Footnotes omitted.)
66. Act § 101(6), 64 Stat. 1019-20, 50 U.S.C. § &11(6) (1951).
67. Act § 101, 64 Stat. 1019-1021, 50 U.S.C. § 811 (1951).
68. See notes 55-59 supra and accompanying text.
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Emergency Detention Act seem to be sound in light of the factual and legal
precedent of the Japanese-American cases, and the implications of the decision
in Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 9 indicating the
Court's approval of the legislative findings behind the Subversive Activities Con-
trol Act of 1950.70
However, the situation is not without voices of objection. John Lord
O'Brian, for example, while realizing the need for security measures, deplores
a trend of government encroachment upon individual liberty, e.g., the establish-
ment of guilt by association; the conferring on administrative officials the right
to investigate and pass upon the character of opinions of individuals and their
rights under the first and fourteenth amendments; adjudging men untrustworthy
because of their ideas and motives or because of suspicion with regard to future
conduct; the use of the Attorney General's list in determining qualifications for
employment; the use of secret information by anonymous accusers; the denial
of the right of cross-examination to those accused; supervision and limitation of
freedom of travel by citizens; the participation of military officials in decisions
affecting the guarantees of the Bill of Rights; the interference with the right of
citizens to work in defense plants or on American ships; and the establishment
of security officers and of hearing panels in all governmental agencies drawn
exclusively from governmental personnel and operating without any central
supervision or determination of uniform procedures. 7 '
In effect, the government permits participation in the Communist Party
and other subversive organizations. But, at the same time, it takes the position
that because of the legislatively-found Communist objective of overthrow of the
government, such participation constitutes a real threat to national security.
Therefore, the government will preclude such participants from governmental
and related employment, etc., and given the proper circumstances, will cause
them to be detained in the name of national security. The presumption is that
such individuals are, or are likely to be, dangerous to the objective of national
security. There can be no doubt that this situation imposes direct obstacles upon
any freedom to associate in a subversively oriented organization, and de facto
does establish guilt by association.7 2 Yet, the freedom to associate remains. And,
where an expressly-mentioned first amendment freedom, e.g., free speech, can be
restricted in the face of a clear and present danger,73 it is not difficult to com-
prehend the implied first amendment freedom of association being restricted
under similar circumstances.
74
It has been advanced that no constitutional problems could arise under the
Act if its provisions became operative during times when the writ of habeas
69. 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
70. See notes 59-60 supra and accompanying text.
71. O'Brian, National Security and Individual Freedom 46-48 (1955).
72. Cf. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
73. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). Cf. American Communications
Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
74. Act § 101(11), (12), 64 Stat. 1020 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 811(11), (12) (1951).
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corpus could be suspended, and if the Act provided for such suspension, for then
both citizens and aliens could be detained.75 This raises the underlying question
of what is the nature of the internal security emergency whereby the Act takes
effect. Three alternative situations will warrant the declaration of the emer-
gency.70 A declaration of war by Congress taken together with the congression-
ally found Communist threat to national security would seem to provide ample
basis for the suspension of the writ. Any constitutional barriers which might
obstruct the Act's effective operation could foreseeably be remedied by the mere
suspension of the writ by Congress upon the declaration of war. The findings
of danger to public safety embodied in the Act would provide the basis for the
suspension. The procedures and administrative directions of the Act would pro-
vide the means whereby the danger could rapidly and effectively be coped with.
In this situation, certainly the carefully considered provision of the Act coupled
with the running files of the Attorney General with respect to security risks,
compares favorably with a snap Executive judgment implemented by the mili-
tary, as was the situation in the Japanese-American cases.
An invasion of the United States would again logically seem suited to
suspension of the writ, for a greater incident of war cannot be conceived. How-
ever, the invasion would have to endanger public safety and be of such connec-
tion with the legislative purpose of the Act as to warrant suspension there-
under. 77 This same limitation would apply equally to the third alternative,
"insurrection within the United States in aid of a foreign enemy."
The probable explanation for the retention of the privilege of the writ in
these situations, which seemingly lend themselves to the writ's suspension is
that the Act is designed to cover situations which are threatening to national
security, but which fall short of the factual bases of situations in which the
Court has refused to interfere with the writ's suspension, e.g., the Japanese
threat to the west coast during World War II. It must be observed that in the
Japanese-American situation, the danger confronted a portion only of the United
States, and the danger was readily ascertainable and susceptible of regulation.
The present danger affects the whole of the United States, is more subtle and
hidden in its machinations, and is thus not readily ascertainable and susceptible
of reasonable regulation. The Communist threat, even in peacetime, poses a more
complex problem from the standpoint of national security safeguards than did
the resident Japanese threat during wartime. The problem, therefore, submits




75. Note, 51 Colum. L. Rev. 606, 652-53 (1951) (raising query as to whether Emer-
gency Detention Act can be constitutional in absence of martial law and without suspension
of writ of habeas corpus).
76. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
77. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 9 (writ of habeas corpus may be suspended when "the public
safety may require it").
78. See Note, 51 Colum. L. Rev. 606, 654-55 (1951); Dunbar, supra note 47, at 222
(asserting that Japanese-American cases afford no clear precedent on the detention issue).
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Should the detention aspects of the Emergency Detention Act be ruled
unconstitutional by the Court as an unwarranted employment of the war power,
e.g., in the absence of martial law and the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus, the situations which give rise to the internal security emergency seem-
ingly could be made the basis of a legislative-executive judgment suspending the
writ, thus saving the effectiveness of the Act. As previously noted, 70 it is doubtful
that the Court would interfere with that legislative judgment viewing past his-
tory, especially the reluctance of the Court to interfere with such judgments in
Hirabayaski, Korematsu and Endo.
Procedural Considerations
Weak from the standpoint of both the fifth and sixth amendments is the
fact that the detainee de facto has the burden of establishing his innocence.
He is detained by virtue of the reasonably grounded belief of the Attorney
General. He is subjected to an administrative proceeding which, with serious
shortcomings, attempts to approximate standard criminal procedure.80 He is
allowed to present evidence in his behalf, but in many conceivable instances this
will amount to no more than the opportunity to present self-testimony, since the
Attorney General may withhold evidence. His ability to compel witnesses to
testify in his behalf could well be impaired by the fact that his place of deten-
tion might be far removed from his place of residence. This would make attend-
ance of witnesses costly and impracticable, considering the mass of cases that
will necessarily arise at once upon the declaration of the internal security emer-
gency.
81
Since the Administrative Procedure Act governs the proceeding, presumably
the test of substantial evidence rather than the test of reasonable doubt will be
the measure.82 The hearing officer is permitted to consider secret evidence. Even
though the Act provides the detainee with the right to cross-examine witnesses
against him, such right would necessarily be denied and limited by admitting
such secret evidence. The discretion of the hearing officer with respect to the
evidence he entertains is wide. He may consider:
(1) Whether such person [detainee] has knowledge of or has received
or given instructions or assignment in the espionage, counterespionage,
or sabotage service or procedures of a government or political party
of a foreign country, or in the espionage, counterespionage or sabotage
service or procedures of the Communist Party of the United States
. . . and whether such knowledge, instruction or assignment has been
acquired or given by reason of civilian, military or police service with
the United States Government, the governments of the several States
79. See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
80. See notes 9-16 supra and accompanying text.
81. See Note, 51 Colum. L. Rev. 606, 646 n.380 (1951) (fourteen thousand Communists
earmarked by Attorney General for detention under the Act, and abandoned military camps
being readied for detention centerg).
82. Cf. Act § 104(d), 64 Stat. 1022-23 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 814(d) (1951): "If from
the evidence it appears to the preliminary hearing officer that there is probable cause ....
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.. or whether such knowledge has been acquired solely by reason
of academic or personal interest not under the supervision of or in
preparation for service with the government of a foreign country or a
foreign political party, or whether, by reason of employment at any
time by the Department of Justice or the Central Intelligence Agency,
such person has made full written disclosure of such knowledge or in-
struction to officials within those agencies and such disclosure has been
made a record in the files of the agency concerned;
(2) Any past act or acts of espionage or sabotage committed by such
person, or any past participation by such person in any attempt or
conspiracy to commit an act of espionage or sabotage against the
United States, any agency or instrumentality thereof, or any public or
private national defense facility within the United States.
(3) Activity in the espionage or sabotage operations of, or the holding
at any time after January 1, 1949, of membership in the Communist
Party of the United States or any other organization or political party
which seeks to overthrow or destroy by force and violence the Govern-
ment of the United States or any of its political subdivisions and the
substitution therefore of a totalitarian dictatorship controlled by a
foreign government.
8 3
What is sought to be proved by these provisions is fleeting and elusive by crim-
inal standards; it is not a fact of an act done but a fact of what might be done.
The sought after conclusion is necessarily conjectural: it can only be proved
by circumstantial evidence, some of which may be kept secret in the interest of
national security.
Due process objections to the Act construed as a criminal statute are many.
Because of the fact that the Attorney General can withhold evidence when he
deems the same to be in the national interest, the detainee conceivably might
be unable to present a defense. He might be unable to test his accusers by cross-
examination, and consequently be unable to offer rebuttal evidence. He might
stand accused by both hearsay and secret evidence-which enter into the hearing
officer's determination.
Basic to a criminal statute is that it must be specific and precisely define
the act which it prohibits so that the nature of the conduct proscribed can be
ascertained. 4 The legislative intent here is plain: prevention of espionage and
sabotage. However, the inarticulate proscription of conduct could well be argued
to violate.due process for vagueness, should the Act be construed as a criminal
statute.
Akin to the essence of Public Law No. 503 in the Japanese cases, the
Emergency Detention Act provides for a fine of not more than $10,000 or
imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both, for persons who attempt to
evade confinement under the Act.8 5 Similar penalty is provided for persons who
83. Act § 109(h), 64 Stat. 1026-27 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 819(h) (1951).
84. See United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89 (1921): "It leaves open
... the widest conceivable inquiry, the scope of which no one can foresee and the result
of which no one can foreshadow or adequately guard against."
85. Act § 112, 64 Stat. 1029-30 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 822 (1951).
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knowingly aid in such evasion.8 6 Anyone who willfully resists or interferes with
Detention Board members or agents in the performance of the Board's duties
shall be subject to a fine of not more than $5,000 or imprisonment for not more
than one year or both. 7 These provisions have been asserted as rendering the
Act a criminal statute;88 but this same commentator feels that, in light of the
Japanese cases, the Act will be upheld not as a criminal statute but as an exer-
cise of the war power:
It is only as a law dealing with espionage and sabotage and not with
free thought or speech that the Act is at all compatible with American
conceptions of justice. Yet we must anticipate, with regret but probable
certainty, that its enforcement will inevitably weaken that popular
confidence in the inviolate character under law of individual rights
which is the ground from which has grown the free, varied and rich
expression of thought in America.
8 9
The ultimate question is whether, without suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus, or without a state of martial law, the Act is a valid exercise of the war
power. An affirmative determination of that issue will apparently overcome any
constitutional objections, for as the Court in Hirabayashi stated: "If it was an
appropriate exercise of the war power its validity is not impaired because it has
restricted the citizen's liberty."8 0
III. CONCLUSION
The Act provides a critically necessary reason for the measures it contains:
a highly organized militant and subversive agency within the United States which
threatens the very bulwarks of our national security. The Communist threat
cannot be discounted as conjectural. Governmental investigation of that threat
has caused the imposition of severe restrictions upon the Communist Party and
its members. The threat has been judicially recognized and the courts have indi-
cated a strong reluctance to interfere with restrictive legislative measures in the
face of strong constitutional objections.
The right of the government to protect itself against subversive elements
threatening its existence is basic. Detention of suspected security risks is an
established method of governmental self-defense during wartime. The present
state of world affairs in which the United States is so vitally engaged has been
appropriately termed the "cold war." Billions of dollars are spent annually by
this nation for national defense. Large standing armies are maintained. The
brink of "hot war" has been dangerously approached several times in the last
few years. The Emergency Detention Act of 1950 was enacted in the wake of
the commencement of a "hot war" in Korea. It is submitted that the state of
affairs as have historically developed the modern "cold war" is appropriate to
86. Act § 113, 64 Stat. 1030 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 823 (1951).
87. Act § 114, 64 Stat. 1030 (1951), 50 U.S.C. § 824 (1951).
88. See Dunbar, supra note 47, at 221-22.
89. Id. at 231.
90. 320 U.S. 81, 89 (1943).
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the imposition of detention measures when urgency demands. It is submitted
further that in light of this "cold war" situation, the threat to national security
posed by subversive organizations and the requirements of the Act which deter-
mine an internal security emergency (all aspects of a "hot war" situation), the
detention proscribed by the Act will be judicially approved regardless of con-
stitutional objection raised; this especially considering the many defensive steps
the government has successfully taken in other pieces of legislation, e.g., the
Smith Act and the Subversive Activities Control Act.
The Act may well be shocking to the conscience of a democratically-oriented
people. By the standards of a criminal statute, the Act would seem doomed to
fall. But in light of the dangers of the times, and the precedent of the Japanese-
American cases of the last world war, the Emergency Detention Act of 1950
seems a valid exercise of the war power, as a self-protective, national defense
measure.
Thomas C. Mack
